Such agents may simply respond to their current environment without worrying about An important task in the analysis of multiagent systems the subsequent reaction of other agents; such behavior is said is to understand how groups of selfish players to be myopic. Now, coalition formation by computationally can form coalitions, i.e., work together in teams. In limited agents has been studied by a number of researchers in this paper, we study the dynamics of coalition formation multi-agent systems, starting with the work of [Shehory and under bounded rationality. We consider settings Kraus, 1999] and [Sandholm and Lesser, 1997]. However, where each team's profit is given by a concave myopic behavior in coalition formation received relatively little function, and propose three profit-sharing schemes, attention in the literature (for some exceptions, see [Dieckmann each of which is based on the concept of marginal and Schwalbe, 2002; Chalkiadakis and Boutilier, 2004; utility. The agents are assumed to be myopic, i.e., Airiau and Sen, 2009]). In contrast, myopic dynamics of they keep changing teams as long as they can increase non-cooperative games is the subject of a growing body of their payoff by doing so. We study the properties research (see, e.g.